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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of the breach by Appellant of a road
construction contract dated September 11, 1974.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court found that Appellant breached the contract
on September 26, 1975, by refusing to pay for road materials
produced by Respondent which met the acceptance tests specified
in the contract, which amounted to an anticipatory breach and
terminated the contract.

The Court awarded Respondent Judgment

in the amount of $1,539,147,05, comprising payment at contract
rates for all work performed to the date of the breach, less pay- ·
ments made thereon by Appellant, anticipated profit on the part
remaining to be performed, and certain other damages incidental
to the breach.

The Lower Court also allowed Appellant certain

offsets totalling $192,392.46, and awarded Respondent a net
Judgment in the amount of $1,346,754.59.
"RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL"
The Respondent by its cross-appeal seeks an Order modifying
the Judgment to award Respondent additional sums as damage for
rental charges incurred by Respondent, on equipment rented from
others.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 11, 1974, the State of Utah, through its State

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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Road Commission,

(now known as the Department of Transportation)

entered into a contract with Industrial Construction, Inc.) and
Pritchett Construction Co., Inc.,

(a Joint Venture), for the

construction of a certain portion of Interstate 15 from Holden
to Scipio.

This suit arose out of breaches of that contract

committed by the Appellant, Department of Transportation.
Prior to the bid opening, Mr. Lalif Wood, President of
Industrial Construction, Inc., noticed that Sheet 55 of the
Special Provisions attached to the contract, contained certain
requirements relating to a drum-dryer mixer (one type of hot
plant utilized to produce asphalt) and that Sheets 56 and 57 of
the Special Provisions contained certain provisions relating to
aggregate storage commonly referred to as "the split stockpile
method".

"Aggregate" is a term that refers to the gravel com-

ponents used to produce asphalt for road surfacing.
Mr. Wood had seen a similar requirement on a job his company had performed in Alamo, Nevada, but his

company was not

required to split the stockpile because it did not use a drumdryer mixer.

(T. 264.)

Before the bids were submitted, Mr. Wood called Mr. C.

v.

Anderson, the Utah State Highway engineer and Assistant Director of the Department of Transportation.

Mr. Anderson told

-2-
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Mr. Wood that the split stockpile provision would not pertain to
Respondent.

(T. 38-41.)

this information.

Respondent bid the project based on

(T. 662.)

However, when the work progressed to the point where the
contractor began to build its stockpile, the Resident Engineer
(also called the Project Engineer)
be split.

(See Ex. D-5.)

insisted that the stockpile

After a series of meetings and cor-

respondence on this subject, the contractor wrote a letter to
the Resident Engineer in which it proposed to set up three stockpiles, desribing the contents of each pile.

The proposal also

stated:
"The material will be fed into the dryer as
reguired in order to meet the gradation specified.
"Sufficient material for two days production
will be stockpiled prior to the start of plant
mix operations."
(Ex. P-2 Emphasis added.)
The last sentence is a paraphrase of a sentence from Sheet
56.

It should also be noted that neither Sheets 56 and 57 nor

the contractor's proposal contained any requirement as to where

the stockpiles were to be located.

(See Ex. D-4, Sheet 56 and

Ex. P-2.)
On June 4, 1975, the Resident Engineer responded by letter
which stated in part that the contractor's proposal for aggregate storage complied with the contract specifications as bid.
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Thereafter, the contractor constructed the three stockpil

es.

However, only one was located at the site of the hot plant. The
other two were located in a gravel pit approximately 8 miles
away at the other end of the project.
At the request of the contractor the Project Engineer sampled all stockpiles and submitted to the contractor, test reports
showing the contents of each stockpile.

(Ex. P-4.)

On August 21, 1975, the contractor informed the Project
Engineer that he intended to install two feeders on the hot plar.t,
and to feed both feeders from the single stockpile.

If the ma-

terial thus produced was not in Specification, whatever was needea
from the other two stockpiles would be hauled up and blended in.
The Project Engineer replied that that would be agreeab.le with
him.

(T. 140.)
On September 18, 1975, the contractor commenced hot plant

operations with the knowledge and cooperation of the Project
Engineer feeding from only one stockpile.

(T. 103-108.)

For

the first six days the contractor produced asphalt having a
value of more than $29,000.00, all of which was in substantial
compliance with the Specifications, according to the daily tests
conducted by the State.

(S€e Ex. P-12, which are the test re-

ports prepared by the State and submitted daily to the contractor.)
As of the sixth day of production, the State had assessed price
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reductions agreed to by the contractor in the amount of $977.33.
(Ex. P-12.)

The contract documents contain extensive provisions setting out the acceptance standards to be applied to the asphalt
product produced, and showing the computations by which the bid
price (in this case $3.00 per ton) could be reduced if the material produced deviated from the standards specified in the
contract.

(See Ex. D-4, pp. 40-50.)

In essence, the Specifications permit a price adjustment
only for variations in the gradation and

bi~urnen

content and the

density of the asphalt produced, and the roughness and smoothness of the final road surface.

(Ex. D-4, p. 50.)

On the seventh day of production,

(September 26, 1975) the

project Engineer hand delivered to the contractor a letter which
stated that the contractor would not be paid for the asphalt produced to that date, because the contractor was not complying
with the split stockpile method of aggregate storage.

(See Ex.P-6.)

The contractor told the Project Engineer that the letter
would force the contractor to shut the job down because the
contractor couldn't continue to produce this material without
being paid for it.

(T. 119-120.}

At that point, the contrac-

tor suspended its operations and wrote the Project Engineer a
letter which stated that the State's action was an arbitrary and
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capricious decision, which amounted to a breach of the contra t
c'
The contractor reiterated that the contractor could not continue
to perform under the condition created by the state's action.
(Ex. P-7.)

In response, the State reaffirmed its position in another
letter and stated that continued performance by the contractor
"will be interpreted as acceptance of a suitable pr ice reduction yet to be determined.

(See Ex. D-3. Emphasis added .. )

At the time the contractor suspended its operation, there
was no other work it could perform,

(T. l6:l) since it had reachec

a stage where the traffic through the construction project prevented any further work.

The contractor intended to finish the

paving which was then in process and switch the traffic
it in order to continue the remaining operations.

onto

(T. 156-157.)

This was frustrated by the letter of September 25, 1975. (T.120.)
However, the contractor felt that with the onset of the
coming winter the construction work accomplished to the date
of suspension would create a hazardous condition on the publie highway through the project (U. s. 91).

(See T. 170-171.)

The contractor called this to the attention of the Department of Transportation,

(T. 171-172 ) and tried repeatedly

to come to an understanding on an acceptable solution, but
reached an impasse.
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Finally, en October 22, 1975, the contractor wrote the Department stating that the contractor felt the greatest consideration should be the safety of the travelling public, and
therefore the contractor intended to pave sufficient of the
balance of the north bound lane to turn the traffic
old highway onto the new construction.

from the

(Ex. P-9.)

The contractor performed this work beginning on October 27,
1975, and continuing for approximately four days.

(T. 177, 179.)

After the traffic was switched the Respondent did no further
work.

The other joint venturer, Pritchett Construction Co.,

did some additional work in order to protect the work previously
accomplished,

from damage.

(T. 134-136.)

The Trial of this natter was conducted in two parts. From
March 25, through April 1, 1976, the Court heard the issues relating only to whether the contract was breached by either party
and, if so, whether the breach was anticipatory.

On April 20,

1976, the court ruled that the Appellant had breached the contract by its refusal to pay for Plaintiff's work which was
within the acceptable limits of the contract, and further, that
the breach was an anticipatory and total breach of the contract.
(See Transcript of Hearing, April 20, 1976, P· 2.)
Thereafter, from June 30, intermittently through July 8,
1976, the Court heard the issues relating to damages.

At the

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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conclusion of the Trial, the court entered Judgment for Respondent in the net amount of $1,346,754.59.

The State of

Utah appealed and the contractor cross-appealed from the refusal of the Court to allow the full amount of rentals paid
by the contractor after the breach on certain essential equiprnent rented from others.
Unfortunately, the reporter who prepared the transcript of
evidence restarted the page numbers of the hearing on the portion of the Trial related to damages with the number "l".

In

order to clarify the references herein to the pages of the trans·
cript, Respondent will use a system wherein "(T. 100)" refers
to page 100 of the transcript on the first phase of the Trial
relating to breach of contract, and "(T-Darn.100)" refers to page
100 of the transcript on the second phase of the Trial relating
to the damages.

"(R. 100)" refers to page 100 of the Record on

Appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED EXCEPT
AS NOTED HEREAFTER IN RESPONDENT'S CROSS-APPEAL.
Appellant, in its Brief, has raised five issues on Appeal.
The first two issues concern alleged errors on the part of the
Trial court in awarding any relief to Plaintiff. The last three
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issues are directed at specific items of damage allowed.
Respondent will address all issues raised by Appellant.
Before doing so, however, Respondent desires to point out some
deficiencies in Appellant's first two points on appeal which
would be the equivalent of a motion to dismiss, as a separate
ground for disposing the issues discussed in those points.
Appellant's Point I alleges error on the part of the Trial
Court in two particulars:
1)

Appellant challenges Conclusion of Law number 2,
entered by the Trial Court. (Note: Apprently there
is no challenge to the remaining ConFlusions.)

2)

Appellant asserts that the Trial Court erred in
failing to hold that Plaintiff was guilty of the
first breach of contract.

These matters will be discussed in order.
1)

As to Conclusion of Law Number 2.
Conclusion of Law Number 2 states:
"2. That the Plaintiff was reasonably led to believe that an adjustment would be made in the provisions of the said construction contract so ~
eliminate the use of the split stockpile method in
Plaintiff's production of Bituminous Surface Course
Material."
(R. 229.)
(Emphasis added.)
APPELLANT'S POINT I IS ENTITLED IN PART:
"THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS EXCUSED FROM HAVING TO COMPLY WITH THE SPLIT
STOCKPILE METHOD IS ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO
LAW • • • • " (EMPHASIS ADDED.)

An examination of the remaining paragraphs of the Conclusions
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of Law entered by the trial court discloses that a modification
of the contract requirement was subsequently adopted which required Plaintiff to construct three stockpiles;

(Conclusion No. l,

R. 229); that Plaintiff did in fact construct three stockpiles;
(Conclusion No. 5, R. 230); that there was no requirement in the
contract as to where the three stockpiles were to be located;
(Conclusion No. 4, R. 229); and that Plaintiff was reasonably
led to believe that it was in compliance with the requirements
of the said construction contract as to the construction and
location of the three stockpiles.

(Conclusion No. 6, R. 230.)

Consequently, the trial court did not conclude, as asserted
by Appellant, that Respondent was excused from complying with the
split stockpile method, but rather the trial court concluded
that Respondent was led to believe that it had adeguately complied with the requirements of the contract concerning the split
stockpile method of storing gravel.

Appellant's assertions

in Point I merely amount to an attempt to create a straw-man,
which is easy to demolish, rather than to demonstrate any defect in the real action taken by the trial court.
Furthermore, the objections alleged by Appellant,

(even if

they were admitted to be valid) come under the heading of har'llless errcr, which should be disregarded.

(Rule 61, U.R.C.P.).

conclusions of Law numbers 7, 8 and 9, state in substance that
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the Buturninous Surface Course asphalt produced by Plaintiff was
in substantial compliance with the acceptance standards set out
in the contract,

(Conclusion No. 7, R. 230.); that Appellant

was not reasonably justified in withholding payment therefor
(Conclusion No. 7, R. 230.); that Appellant's obligation to pay
for such acceptable asphalt was a material and essential part of
the performance required of Appellant under the contract and was
necessary at that time in order to require continued performance
of Respondent,

(Conclusion No. 8, R. 230.); and that Appellant

breached the contract by its refusal to pay for the asphalt produced through September 26, 1975, which constituted an anticipatory breach of the contract on the part of Appellant, which
terminated the contract and excused Respondent from further performance.

(Conclusion No. 9, R. 230-231.)

Conclusion of Law number 2 is not a necessary foundation
for the matters contained in Conclusions of Law numbers 7, 8
and 9, so that a reversal of paragraph 2 would not require a
reversal of paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 to which Appellant has made
no objection.
Consequently, it is submitted that Appellant's arguments
on this issue are misleading and would not affect any substantial rights of the parties, or require a reversal of the Judgment.
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2)

As to Appellant's contention that Respondent
was guilty of the "first breach".

An examination of the pleadings and the transcript of
trial disclose that this point was not raised before the trial
court but raised for the first time on appeal.

This court shoulc

refuse to consider issues and defenses raised for the first tiE
on appeal.

See, In re Estate of Ekker, 19 U.2d 414, 432 P.2d 45:

Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd

w.

Keller Corp., 15 U.2d 318,

392 P.2d 620.
Furthermore, if Appellant had intended to raise this point,
it should have done so as an affirmative defense in its Answer.
This was not done.

Therefore, Appellant waived this defense.

See Rule 12 (h) , U. R. c. P.
The same defect exists with respect to Appellant's contention in Point II of its Brief that,

"

under the doctrine

of election of remedies the actions of the joint venture part~ after the alleged breach constituted an election to con-

tinue performance and Respondent has breached the revived
contract."

(Emphasis added.)

On the first day of the Trial, Appellant sought and was
granted leave to amend its Answer and counter-Claim.

In its

Amended Answer, Appellant alleged as a Third Affirmative Defense
that " • .

• Plaintiffs, by their actions, have waived the right

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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to assert that Defendant has breached the contract on the ground
and for the reason that Pritchett Construction Company has continued performance under the contract • • • " (R. 69.) (Emphasis
added.)
The issues relating to Pritchett Construction Co., were
subsequently severed for trial at a subsequent date by stipulation of the parties on the record.

(T-Dam. 10.)

No Judgment

has yet been entered as to the issues which relate to Pritchett
Construction Co., and Pritchett Construction Co. is not a Respondent on this appeal, even though its name continues to appear in the title of this case.
However, Appellant never contended before the trial court
or in its pleadings that the actions of Respondent, Industrial
Construction, Inc., constituted an election of remedies or an
election to continue performance, or that "Respondent has breached
the revived contract" as Appellant now contends in Point II of
of its Brief on Appeal.

These are also defenses that should

have been raised by affirmative defense in the pleadings, or
they are waived according to Rule 12(h), U.R.C.P.

Appellant

should not now be allowed to raise these defenses for the first
time o~ appeal.

see, In re Estate of Ekker, supra; Porcupine

Reservoir co. v. Lloyd

w.

Keller Corp., supra.
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For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that
Appellant's Points I and II of its Brief on appeal, and the

r~

lief requested therein (reversal of the Judgment and a new trial)
should be dismissed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBER
TWO AND RESPONDENT DID NOT FIRST BREACH THE CONTRACT.
Respondent does not intend to try to prove (in opposition
to Point I of Appellant's Brief) that the Trial Court was justified in holding that Respondent was excused from complying
with the split stockpile method.

As set out in Point I above,

that was not the nature of the conclusion entered by the trial
court.
The trial court did

.!:!2.!:.

say in this paragraph that the con-

tract was modified so as to eliminate the split stockpile requirement.

It only said that the Plaintiff was reasonably led

to believe that tre contract would be so modified.
There is ample support in the record for this conclusion.
In paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the Findings of Fact, the court
found in substance that prior to the bid opening, Mr. Lalif
wood had a telephone conversation with Mr. C. V. Anderson, the
·
Utah State Highway Engineer.

(R • 217 . )

In substance, Mr. Wood

lit stock·
testified that he was told by Mr. An d erson that the Sp
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pile requirement of Sheet #56 would not apply to his hot plant
operations if he were the successful bidder.

(T. 38-41).

It

was upon this understanding that the Plaintiff submitted its
bid.

(T. 662.)
It is true tla t Mr. Anderson disputed Mr. wood's testimony.

(T. 416-421).

However, the testimony of Mr. Wood is substantial

evidence which supports the court's Findings and Conclusion, so
that they should not be overturned on appeal.
Remco, Inc.,

See, Wagstaff v.

540 P.2d 931.

The Appellant next contends, however, that Conclusion of
Law No. 2 should nevertheless be reversed because it is presumed
that all negotiations between parties who subsequently enter
into a written contract are merged into the contract.
Here again, it should be noted that the trial court did not
conclude that the contract was modi£ied prior to the bid opening to conform to the telephone conversation, but it only concluded that Plaintiff was reasonably led to believe that the
contract would be so modified.
In paragraph 3 of its conclusions of Law, the trial court
concluded that the construction contract was subsequently modified by mutual agreement of the parties whereby Plaintiff was
to construct three stockpiles.

(R. 229.)
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..

This conclusion is also supported by the evidence in ~e
form of a letter which was written on May 28, 1975, by the ~~
tractor at the request of the Project Engineer proposing the
use of three stockpiles.

This proposal was approved by letter

from the Resident Engineer dated June 4, 1975.

(Ex. P-3.)

This modification agreement being reduced to writing and
entered into subsequent to the date of the original construction
contract, is not subject to the merger doctrine announced in
the case cited by Appellant.
It should also be noted that Appellant has never contended
either at the trial or in its Brief on appeal that the letter of
May 28, 1975,

(Ex. P-2)

did not constitute a valid modification

of the construction contract.
On the contrary, the Appellant in its Brief on appeal states:
"The real question, it is asserted, is rather
what did Respondent's proposal as contained in the
letter of May 28, 1975, (Ex. P-2) obligate Respondent to do and has Respondent breached that obligation?" (Appellant's Brief, p. 10. Emphasis added.)
Appellant next contends that the court was in error in
finding that "neither the original specification nor the modification contained any requirement where the three stockpiles
were to be

~ocated.

Brief, p. 11.)

(Finding of Fact No. 4.) " (Appellant's

(Note:

The reference should have been to
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conclusion of Law No. 4.)
This contention of the Appellant is astounding.

Both the

original specification (Ex. D-4 pp. 56 and 57) and the motification referred to (Ex. P-2) are in writing.

A simple examina-

tion of those documents reveals that the Conclusion of Law
referred to was correct, for neither document c01.tains any reference whatsoever with respect to the location of the stockpiles.
In fact, Appellant in its Brief on appeal, concedes that this is
the fact.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 11.)

Nevertheless, the Appellant argues that because the contractor did not locate the three stockpiles at the site of the
hot plant, it committed the first breach of the contract, which
in effect excused the subsequent breach on the part of the Appellant.

At this point, it is appropriate and significant to

point out that nowhere in its Brief on appeal does the Appellant
contend that it did not breach the contract.

It merely asserts

that the Respondent breached the contract ~·
In order to support this assertion, the Appellant relies
on an amazing process of logic, rather than on solid evidence.
After conceding that the "language of the special provision" or
the Respondent's letter of May 28, 1975, does~ require that
the stockpiles be located at the hot plant site, Appellant states:
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"While it is true that the exact language
does not exist in either Exhibit, Appellant
asserts that anyone of conunon intelligence
would obviously assume that a competent contractor would locate the separate sized piles
at the plant site." (Appellant's Brief, p. 12.
Ernphas is added.)
It takes a supremely self-confident lawyer (who is normally
a layman as regards the contracting business) to make a statement like that.

Yet Appellant fails to cite any other substan-

tial basis in support of its contention that the contract require:
the stockpiles to be located at the hot plant site.
~,a_

Appellant cited the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs.
Midwest Realty & Finance co. 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975), where
this Court stated:
"Further, when a document is of that char-acter Q-.e., ambiguous or uncertain;), the trial
court can take extraneous evidence and look into
the total circumstances to determine what the parties should reasonably be deemed to have understood
thereby."
(Emphasis added.)
Among the "total circumstances" which were introduced into
evidence in this case as having a bearing on the understanding
of the parties, were the following:

a.

The contractor's letter of May 28, 1975, (EX.P-2)
states:
"Aggregate will be stored in three (3)
stockpiles. The natural materials will be
directed into one stockpile. The material
be:in g crushed will be split on the No. 4 screen
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the plus 4 material will be put into a second
pile and tile: rpinus 4 material will be put
into a third pile. The material will be
fed into the drier ~ required in order to
meet the gradation specified." (°Emphasis-;dded.)
b.

The contractor testified that he constructed the
plus 4 and the minus 4 stockpiles in Pit #2, (at
the crusher at the south end of the project) , while
the remaining pile was built in Pit #4. (At the
north end of the project) , which was also the location of the hot plant.
(T. 65-66.)

c.

The State personnel took tests of the material
in these stockpiles to determine whether they
would meet the requirements.
(T. 67.)
Therefore,
they obviously knew the locations of the stockpiles.

d.

The State personnel rendered written reports of
the content of each pile to the contractor (T. 67-70.)
These reports were introduced into evidence as Ex.P-4
and the location of each pile is noted on the corresponding report.

e.

Both Sheet 56 of Ex. D-4 and the contractor's
letter of May 28, 1975, (Ex. P-2) state that the
contractor will have sufficient material in the
stockpiles for two day's operations~ commencing his hot plant operations. W. J. Stephenson,
the State Materials Engineer, testified that according to the Specifications, it is the responsibility
of the Project Engineer to determine whether the
contractor has two day's material in the stockpiles
before the hot plant operations are conunenced.(T.327.)

f.

The evidence was uncontroverted that prior to commencing its hot plant operations on September 18,
1975, the contractor notified the Project Engineer
of its intention to start up and requested the
State to have its personnel there to run the acceptance tests required by the contract.
(T. 103-108.)
No one testified as to any objection on the part of
the project Engineer to the start-up notice on the
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basis that the contractor did not have the required
stockpiles at the hot plant site, or on any other
basis.
Based upon this state of the evidence, the trial court was
clearly justified in determining that from the total circumstances the parties should reasonably be deemed to have understood
that the contractor was not required by the contract to have its
stockpiles physically located at the hot plant site.
This was also supported by Conclusion of Law No. 5, which
states that the two stockpiles which were not at the hot plant
site "were a small distance from the hot plant but were available for blending purposes if the contractor found their use to
be necessary." (R. 230.)
Taken together, these Conclusions of Law,

(which are

amply supported by the evidence) demonstrate a coherent, reasonable interpretation of the intention of the parties.
Appellant also attempts to assert that the asphalt material produced by Respondent did not meet with the specifications.

Yet the evidence is uncontroverted tl:a t between September

18, 1975 and September 26, 1975, the contracor produced asphalt

having a value at contract prices of $29,712.90 against which
the state was allowed to deduct $977.33 for material which did
not totally comply with the Specifications.

Furthermore,
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the State's Materials Engineer, testified that so long as the
contractor's product did not fall below the 70% pay factor
the contractor was producing acceptable material according to
the contract.

(T. 348.)

The lowest pay factor on any day for

material produced by Respondent was 90%.

(Ex. P-12.)

Appellant also argues that Respondent first breached the
agreement by refusing to comply with directions of the Project
Engineer.

As noted above, this defense was raised for tJ:e

first time on appeal.
The basis for this assertion is a letter which the Project
Engineer wrote the contractor on September 23, 1975 (five days
after the contractor had started up its hot plant operations).
This letter was introduced into evidence as Ex. P-5.

In it the

Project Engineer acknowledged that the contractor had indeed
constructed three stockpiles as proposed by the Jetter of May
28, 1975, and that the asphalt material being produced was in
substantial compliance with the gradation requirements of the
contract.

However, the project Engineer also stated that two

of the stockpiles were "unavailable for use at the hot mix
plant. "

He then concluded:
"To comply with sub-sections numbers
403.03 and 407.03, you are directed to
supply two or more stockpiles at the
(Ex. P-5.)
plant site"
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Appellant's Brief states as follows:
"Appellant's letter of September 23, 1975,

(Ex. P-5) and Respondent's continued refusal
to comply with the Engineer's direction to povide at least two stockpiles at the hot plant
sits, (R. 6 73) constituted a breach of contract."
(Emphasis added.)
(See Appellant's Brief, p.16.)
However, contrary to Appellant' s assertion, no witness testified nor was any evidence introduced to the effect that the
contractor refused (not to mention"continued refusal") to comply with the Engineer's direction.
Mr. Wood testified that after he received the letter in
question (Ex. P-5) he had a conversation with the Resident Engineer in which he told the Resident Engineer in substance that
material from the other stockpiles was available within 20 minutes
that he didn't need the material from the other stockpiles;

a~

that he told the Engineer that if he would give the contractor
a letter directing it to move the stockpiles and agreeing to pav
for the material if the contractor did not use it, it would be
moved.

(T.

ll5.)

No one testified that there was any further

action taken on this subject.

It is respectfully submitted that

the foregoing does not constitute a refusal to follow the order
of the Engineer.

Furthermore, the contractor is not bound to

accept the Engineer's unilaterial interpretation of the contract.

The contractor is bound only to follow the lawful orders
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of the Engineer.
The most that could be said for Ex. P-5 is that it expresses
the view of the Project Engineer that the Special Provisions required all stockpiles to be located at the hot plant site, although the provisions themselves are silent on the matter.

Ex. D-4, pp. 56-57.)

(See

However, even the State's own witnesses

testified that the contractor's letter of May 28, 1975,
had modified the Special Provisions (T. 361.)
which is an inter-office memo from

w.

(Ex.p-2)

See also Ex. D-11,

J. Stephenson (the State

Materials Engineer) to the Project Engineer in,which he states
in part:

"Any further interpretations or modifications of the

Specifications, as seems to be included in your letter of 9/23/75,
should not be considered."

(Emphasis added.)

In view of the total evidence, the trial court was justified in concluding that the contract documents did not contain
any requirement as to where the three stockpiles were to be
located; that the Plaintiff did construct the three stockpiles
required, all of which were available for use if necessazy:

and

that the contractor was reasonably led to believe that it was in
compliance with the requirements of the construction contract as
to the construction and location of the stockpiles, in that the
location of the three stockpiles was at all times known to the

-23-
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Defendant, and on September 18, 1975, the Plaintiff was allowed
by the Defendant to start up it hot plant and commence its
paving operations without any objection from the Defendant.
(See Conclusions of Law Nos. 4, 5 and 6.

R. 229-230.)

POINT III
THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT GUILTY OF THE FIRST BREACH OF THE
CONTRACT AND DID NOT ELECT TO CONTINUE PERFORMANCE AFTER THE
BREACH OF CONTRACT BY APPELLANT.
Respondent has covered in Point II the assertion of Appell·
ant to the effect that the contractor allegedly breached the
contract first.

Suffice it here to say that there is no basis

in the evidence for such assertion, and the Appellant raised
this argument for the first time on appeal.
The Appellant has also asserted that " • . . the actions of
both of the Respondent joint venture partners subsequent to the
breach determined by the trial court constitute an election to
proceed with performance of the contract • . . . " (Appellant's
Brief, p. 18.

Emphasis added.)

This assertion is also disputed by Respondent.

In support

of this assertion, Appellant has cited cases to the effect that
forfeitures are not favored in the law. Respondent submits that
th·is case does not involve
·
·
such cases are not appropriate,
since
a forfeiture, but rather deals with breach of contract.
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Appellant cited several cases which supposedly support its
position that " . • • work done after a breach is to be paid for
at contract prices and binds him to perform."

(Appellant's

Brief, p. 22.)
However,

Appellant has carefully avoided any discussion of

the real test of an election to continue under the contract, i.e.,
did the contractor intend to continue under the contract?

All

the cases cited by Appellant in support of its position held
that in those cases the contractor intended to maintain the contract in force after breach by the other party.The same is not true in the instant case.

Here the court

found that Repondent performed work after the date of the breach
because of unsafe conditions on Highway 91.

"

• and solely

in the interest of protecting the motoring public from undue
risks in transversing the construction project • •
of Fact No. 24, R. 222.)

" (Finding

This finding is supported by sub-

stantial evidence in the record.
Mro Wood testified that after the breach on the part of
the State which caused the co~tractor to suspend its operations,
he contacted

c. v.

Anderson, the State Highway Engineer, and

told him that the existing road (Highway 91) through the project,
constituted a hazard which should not be left through the winter
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and that something had to be done.

(T.130.)

Mr. Wood also des-

cribed the hazard which had been created by the construction~
the freeway embankments on each side of Highway 91, and the placing of drains to direct water into the median (which was when
Highway 91 was located at that time), and testified that, in his

opinion, in freezing weather any cars coning down the road in thi

canyon would have no other place to go than just to run into eac'
other.

(T. 169-1 71.)

He also stated that in order to remedy thii

hazard, he went to work so that the traffic could be switched
from Highway 91 in that area onto the north bound lane.

(T.169.)

He also testified that he had previously met with Blaine
Kay,

(the Director of Highways for the State of Utah) , and told

him,

"if someone had an accident in that area, both our'selves

and the State would have a pretty hard time coming up with a
reason for leaving it in that condition."

(T. 172.)

Mr. Kay

responded that he woul<l contact the District Office and get back
in touch with the contractor, but he failed to do so.

(T. 173.)

Finally, before doing the work in question, the contractor,
on October 22, 1975, delivered to the State the following letter:
"This will acknowledge the letter which you
hand delivered to our office on Octooer 21, 1975. In
view of the extensive efforts whic~ we have made to
finish the north bound lane to the point where traffic
can be turned on to it, and in view of the constant resistance and interference which we have received
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from the Department, which have frustrated all of
our efforts to date, beginning with your letter of
September 25, 1975, we do not appreciate your opening
statement which attempts to inpugn our intentions in
this regard.
"Furthermore, we do not intend to undertake the
'corrections' which you outlined in your letter, as
we consider that our contract with the state has been
terminated due to the breach of contract on the part
of the state.
"However, solely in the interest of the safety of
the public, we do intend to do such work as is required
to put the traffic onto the north bound lane, and we are
firm in our position that we are entitled to be paid for
that work on the basis of force account.
"We invite your cooperation in getting this work
done.
In view of the private assurances which we have
received from you and from others, we do not expect any
interference from the state, since we feel that this is
emergency work, being done under emergency conditions." (Ex.P-9.)
In response to the foregoing evidence the Appellant proferred testimony to the effect that it had made two contingency
plans to handle the traffic either by using Highway 91, or by
using the State maintenance forces to complete the necessary paving to turn the traffic onto the north bound lane.

(T. 700.) How-

ever, it became clear that these plans had not be communicated to
the contract and the court sustained an objection to the proffer.
(T. 701.)
Since the crucial question is to determine whether the contractor intended to proceed under the contract, it is respectfully
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submitted that the State's proffer of proof was properly rejected.

Since the State's plans were never made known to the con-

tractor, they could hardly be probative of the contractor's
intentions in doing the work performed after operations were
shut down.
The evidence as to the work done by Pritchett Construction
Company was admitted on a proffer of proof by Pritchett's attorney, which the State's attorney admitted by stipulation. (T.135-J:
That proffer stated that after Industrial Construction discontin>ii
work there were two items which Pritchett felt it was importantt:
complete to protect the public and preserve the job from substan·
tial damage.

The first item was to complete a culvert which was

necessary to handle the spring run-off.

This matter was dis-

cussed with the project engineer, who desired to have that work
done, and who stated that something would have to be done if the
culvert were not completed.

That work was done at a cost to

Pritchett Construction of approximately $5,000.00 in labor a~
another $5,000.00 in materials.

The second item was the install·

ation of an expansion joint on a bridge which had been constructei.:
This joint was necessary to protect the bridge against winter
weather and to keep ice out of it.
man-day.

This work required about one

(T. 135-136.)
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When measured against a total contract price of almost
$7,000,000.00, these items would not appear to indicate any intention of waiving the breach and resuming operations.
In its brief, Appellant asserts trat " •

plans had been

made Q:>y the State) which alleviated the need for the work to be
done as alleged by Pritchett."

(Appellant's brief, p. 24.)

How-

ever, the same witness for the State testified that he didn't
know of anyone who knew of these plans, except for himself and
the Project Engineer.
opinion

it~

(T. 682.)

He also testified that in his

necessary to do something to let'the water drain

away from the grade (road embankment) in order to save the grade.
(T. 683.)

The evidence before the court amply supports the Findings
of Fact entered by the trial court, which this court should sustain.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS AWARD OF ANTICIPATED
PROFITS.
The trial court found that the State of Utah breached the
construction contract and that such breach was a material breach
of its duties under the contract, which constituted an anticipatory breach by Defendant.

The trial court awarded Plaintiff

$340,025.18, as the amount of profit anticipated to be earned
on the portion of the contract remaining to be performed as of
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the date of the breach by Appellant.
Apparently, Appellant does not appeal from the findings of
the court that its breach constituted an anticipatory breach
(since that issue was not raised on appeal) , but claims only that
the amount awarded is excessive.
Admittedly, since we are dealing with profits which the con·
tractor anticipated would be earned over the future performance,
and since the contract was not performed due to the breach and
termination thereof by the State, the figures are not as susceptible of definite proof as they would be, had the contract been
performed.

However, it is a well recognized rule of law that the

difficulty involved in exact determination of damages for lost
profits does not preclude their recovery.

In establishing loss

of future profits it is only the fact that some loss has resulted
from Appellant's breach which must be proved with certainty.

The

amount of lost profits may be estimated from all the evidence ad·
mitted.

See, Howarth v. Ostergard, 20 U.2d 183, 515 P.2d 442;

Gardner v. The Calvert, 253 F.2d 395; Smith v. Onyx Oil

&

Chemi-

cal co., 218 F.2d 104.
The cases do not lay down a single formula by which antici·
pated profits must be calculated, and various methods have been
approved.

rnc ,
Thus, in Pat Jo Murphy, Inc. v. Drummon<lDo 1 omi· t e, __.;.
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232 F.Supp. 509, the court computed anticipated profits by find-

ing the average percentage of the contractor's net income compared to its gross income for the previous five years, and applied
that percentage figure to the costs the contractor incurred on
the contract in question.
In Frank Horton & Co. v. Cook Electric Co., 356 F.2d 485, the
court awarded anticipated profits to the contractor in the amount
of $175,917.84.

The appeals court stated:

"In arrving at this figure, the court considered a rough cost estimate prepared by 'Horton
in November, 1960, a more detailed estimate also
prepared by Horton in January, 1963, and Horton's
own testimony. Cook argues that the detailed estimates should not have been admitted as the summaries
of an expert because the estimates were self-serving
and because Horton did not sufficiently explain the
manner in which the work would have been performed.
The court, however, expressly recognized the selfserving nature of the cost estimates. It adjusted
the estimates upwards in many instances, and chose
to credit Horton's calculations in other instances
• • • • We think that the district judge properly
admitted Horton's cost memoranda. Hortorrs calculations provided the best method of proving lost profit
which could have been adopted. (Id. 356 F.2d at 492.)
(Emphasis added.)
The computation in the instant case is somewhat similar to
that presented in the Horton case, supra.

Mrs. Hitchcock, the

office manager of Industrial construction, Inc., testified that
she participated in the preparation of the bid on the contract
in issue.

(T.-Dam. 143.)

She testified as to the elements
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which were estimated at that time as anticipated cost and anticipated profit of the contract i terns in preparing the contractor's
(T.-Dam. 17-20.) and stated 30% was about normal for ~ross

bid,

profit.

(T.-Dam. 149-150.)

Mrs. Hitchcock also adjusted this

gross profit to arrive at net profits.

(T.-Dam. 146-147.)

She also identified and there was introduced into evidence
as Exhibit P-41, a computation of anticipated profits on the work
remaining to be done as of the date of Appellant's breach of the
contract.

In some cases the profits originally anticipated were

adjusted downward on Exhibit P-41 because of the contractor's ex·
perience to the date of the breach.

(T.-Dam.107-109.)

The State did not introduce any expert witness who could tes·
tify as to anticipated costs and profits.

However, Robert Rowley,

a witness called by the State, testified that the Special Condi·
tions applicable to this construction contract allowed the contractor a profit equal to 30% of the cost of labor for all work
done on force account (cost plus) •

(T.-Dam. 192-193.)

It should be noted that the State has not challenged the
sufficiency of this evidence, but claims only that the figures
show that there would not be enough money left in the unpaid
amount of the total contract pr ice (after deducting anticipated
costs)

to justify this award.

(Appellant's brief, p. 25.)
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The State has included in its brief a complicated and hardto-follow computation, which it claims justifies its position.
Respondent asserts that the computation is in error in several
particulars.
In the first place, the figures used by the State do not
coincide with the figures as found by the Court •

(Cf., Find:in g

of Fact No. 25, R. 222-223.)
In the second place, on the bottom half of page 30 of Appellant's brief the figure of $166,876.38 has been deducted from
the balance available to pay profits.

These figures are a total

of four items representing overpayments to the contractor for
work already performed prior to the date of the breach.

While

the court found that credit should be allowed the State for
these items, they actually represent a reduction of the amount
paid on the contract prior to September 25, 1975, and therefore,
a corresponding increase in the amount remaining available to be
paid for work

don~ ~

that date.

The doubling effect of de-

ducting rather than adding this sum to the balance available
creates an error in the amount of $333,742.76, which is almost
enough by itself to account for the full amount of anticipated
profit allowed by the court • . When added to the $90,301.35 which
Appellant admitted as still remai~ing, (Appellant's brief, p.32),
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it becomes apparent that there is approximately $425,000.00
available to pay the anticipated profit awarded by the court
in the amount of $340,025.18.
Based upon the evidence presented, the trial

court found

that the contractor had anticipated a gross profit of 30% on
this contract.
at

~

profit.

The court then reduced this to 20% to arrive
(R. 228.)

It is apparent from the evidence that

the amount awarded was substantailly less than the amount which
would have been justified by the testimony of either the witness
for the State (Mr. Rowley) or the witness for the con~ractor,
(Mrs. Hitchcock).

This would appear to be within the guidelines

and the sound discretion of the trial judge as laid down ;by this
court in the case of Even Odds, Inc., v. Nielson, 22 U.2d 49,
448 P.2d 709 as follows:
"Speaking generally about damages, the desired objective is to evaluate any loss suffered by the most
direct, practical and accurate method that can be
employed.

* * * * *

"We have no disagreement with the proposition that
the fact-trier should not be permitted to arbitrarily
ignore competent, credible and uncontroverted evidence.
Nevertheless, he is not bound to slavishly follow the
evidence and figures given by any particular witness.
Within the limits of reason it is his perogative to place
his own appraisal upon the evidence which impresses him
as credible and to draw conclusions therefrom in accordance with his own best judgment."

-34-
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For the foregoing reasons, the award of anticipated profits
should be either sustained or adjusted upwards.
POINT V
THE AWARD OF GENERAL DAMAGES IS PROPER AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
In its brief, Appellant states that is "is not contesting
the right of a court tocward general damages, assuming the fact
of a breach of contract."

Appellant limits its attack to an asser-

tion that the award is not supportable by substantial evidence in
the record.
The court awarded general damages in the sum of $100,000.00,
(the sum prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint) based upon a finding that the Plaintiff had suffered this damage as the probable
and necessary result of the intentional acts constituting the anticipatory breach by Defendant.

The court found that Plaintiff

was damaged in that Plaintiff was, unable to bid and bond other
work while this matter was unresolved; that the breach of Defendant also damaged Plaintiff's credit reputation by interrupting
Plaintiff's cash flow; that Plaintiff's earning capacity was damaged; and that by reason of Defendant's acts, Plaintiff had been
subjected to suits from other creditors on this contract, which
resulted in additional counsel fees (in those other cases) and
other normal damages.

(See Finding of Fact No.32(d), R.227.)
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This finding was based upon the testimony of Mrs. Hitchcock,
office manager of the contractor.
As noted above in Point IV, after the fact of loss is estab.
lished, the court can estimate the amount of damage "

from

the facts in evidence, including the inferences to be drawn from
them, and the probabilities which they suggest."
Calvert, 253 F.2d 395, 399.

Gardner v. The

(Emphasis added.)

Among the facts in evidence pertinent to this issue are the
following:
1. The Plaintiff had the contracting capacity to
bid and bond th is contract, amounting to almost $ 7, 000, 000.
Part of this was to be performed by sub-contractors to
whom Plaintiff was liable.
2. At the same time the contractor was also performing another contract for the State of Utah. (T.-Darn.173.)
3. Construction commenced on this contract August 24,
1974, (T.-Darn.35); the breach occurred September, 1975,
(or a total time in progress of 13 months) , during which
time the contractor had received $3, 715, 324 for work performe:
Among the inferences which could be drawn from this evidence
are the following:
1. The contractor's average monthly cash flow from
this project alone was $285,795.00
2. The fact that the State improperly terminated
the construction contract with the contractor does .!1£!
excuse the contractor on the sub-contracts and equipment rental agreements it had entered nto in reliance
upon his contract with the State.
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3. Yet the State's breach and termination of the
contract deprived the contractor of the cash flow needed
to pay its sub-contractors and suppliers, and subjected
the contractor to suits from them.
4. The fact that the State refused to recognize
its breach and make appropriate relief available to the
contractor, but, on the contrary, insisted that the contract was still in force, tied up at least $7,000,000 of
Plaintiff's bonding capacity until this dispute was resolved, a period of 16 months (not counting time on appeal.)
Against this figure alone the award of $100,000.00 represents a recovery rate to Plaintiff of only about 1% per annum.
All of these types of damage are normal and necessary consequences of the breach of this contract, and as such could have
been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into.

Conse-

quently, these items are compensable within the rule of reasonable
foreseeability.

See, Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford

Accident and Indemnity Co., 7 U.2d 377, 325 P.2d 906, 907.
It is most probable, in view of the amounts involved, that
the trial court would have awarded damages in a greater amount,
but limited the recovery to $100,000 because that was all that
was prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint.
From the foregoing, it would appear that the award was
supported by substantial evidence, arrl should be sustained.
POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF VARIOUS
OTHER ITEMS OF DAMAGE AND THE REJECTION OF CLAIMED OFF-SETS.
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Under Point V of its brief, Appellant challenges five item•
of damage awarded to Respondent by the trial court, claiming the,
was no evidence to support these awards.

Appellant also com-

plains that the court failed to grant a greater off-set than was
allowed for one item referred to as "finishing the sub-grade."
These challenges go only to the question of whether the e:idence supports the court's awards.

Respondent asserts the evidec

submitted supports the court's decision.
(1)

UnrecoveIEd cost of water.

Mrs. Hitchcock, the office manager of Respondent, testified
that as of the time the contract terminated due to the breach of
Appellant, the contractor had not recovered the sum of $19,573.ll,
constituting the unpaid balance of a total cost of $77, 372 .04.
Exhibit P-52 was introduced into evidence showing the computatio~
of this item.
Appellant's attack on this i tern is based upon Appellant's
view that the cost of water must be included under an item enti·
tled, "Mobilization", which is an item in the contract,

(the

amount of which is determined by the contractor on a bid basis)
to compensate the contractor for setting up costs incurred in
preparation of its performance under the contract.
Appellant quotes an extract from Section 601.01 of the
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standard Specifications (Ex. D-2 p. 269) which defines "Mobiliztion".

However, although Appellant has underlined the last four

lines, it has ignored the effect of the words " • • . not otherwise paid for
Section 207 of the same specifications (Ex. D-2,pp.82,83)
is a section entitled "Watering", and provides that water shall
be paid for at the unit contract price per 1,000 gallons, showing
that payment for water is n2!. normally included under the heading of "Mobilization".
Mrs. Hitchcock testified that the Special Provisions for this
contract required that the cost cf water has to be included in other
items of work (T.-Dam.34.)

She testified that the contractor had

allocated the cost of water to the items of the contract that required the use of water. (T.-Dam. 37).

This testimony was fur-

ther corroborated by her testimony as to anticipated profits,in
that she testified that the allocated cost of water was charged as
an expense to the various items where water was used in computing
the amount of profit anticipated.

(See T.-Dam. 104, 127.)

Respondent submits that the foregoing constitutes substantial
evidence and amply supports the Court's decision.
(2)
(4)

SALARIES TO KEY PERSOfil.l""EL
EQUIPMENT REANTAL PAID TO OTHERS
-39-
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--These points will be cover e d in
· Respon d ent • s Cross-Appeal,
under Point VII, which is incorporated herein in opposition to
Appellant's arguments.
(5)

BITUMINOUS PAVING DONE AFTER BREACH

Appellant argues only that recovery for this item should be
the contract price or the reasonable value of the work, rather
than the basis used by the Court.
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the court's fine·
ings, that the contract was terminated on September 26, 1975, due
to Appellant's breach (from which finding there has been no appeal)
it would be totally inconsistent for the court to base its award
on prices found in this contract.
Furthermore, since the court found that the contracto'r performed the work ".

• • to turn the traffic from that portion of

Highway 91 which constituted a danger to the motoring public"
(R.22 7.) , how could any standard of proof be devised to show the
reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon the public by rea·
son of averting that danger?
On the other hand, the State's own witness testified that
the State had formulated plans which included doing the same work
as performed by the contractor, but using the State's own maintenance forces.

(T. 700.)

Since the State failed to offer any
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evidence as to its anticipated cost of doing the work with its
own forces the trial court could justifiably reason that the costs
incurred by the contractor plus a reasonable allowance for profit would be cheaper than the costs incurred by the State to do
the same work.

(Otherwise, it would appear that the State could

save money by doing all road construction work with its own forees
rather than contracting out the work as is its normal practice.)
Under this assumption the amount awarded would be

~

than

the reasonable value of the work (measured by the costs saved

.!2:l.

the State) and the award should be affirmed.
(3)

RESTORATION OF PRICE REDUCTION

The Court found that on the fourth day of asphalt production
the State forces made an error in the test results, and the court
restored to the contractor a price reduction of $1,822.37 which
the State had unilaterally attempted to assess.
The State "finds this to be one of the most distasteful acts
of the trial court." (Appellant's brief pp.43-44.) This is "distasteful" because it is difficult for the State to admit it
commits errors.

Yet that is precisely what Mr. Weldon Heaton, (the

State employee responsible for the error) admitted on the stand.
(T. 528.)

Mr. Wood testified that as a result of the information he
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received from this erroneous test result, he ordered adjustments
to be made in the hot plant, and that before the error in the~s:
information was discovered the hot plant had been readjusted. (T.~
Furthermore, Ex. P-16, which is a letter from the Project E:

b

b

gineer on the same subject admits that changes had been made in
the hot plant.

(See Ex. P-16, second page, 1st paragraph.)

It is respectfully submitted that the restoration of this a:·
tempted price reduction is amply supported by substantial evidenc
(6)

OFFSET CLAIMED BY THE STATE BUT NOT ALLOWED BY THE COil[

The Appellant claimed that it was entitled to a reduction or
offset against amounts previously paid the contractor under the
i tern "Roadway Excavation" because some of the embankment had not
been "finished"
the breach.

(i.e., graded to a smooth furface)

c:

The contractor conceded that an offset in the amount

$11,055 would be proper.
Mr. Wood,

at the date

This figure was based upon the opinion:

President of Respondent, of the cost of the finishing

work Plaintiff was not required to perform.

(T.-Dam. 542-552.)

The law is clear that the basis for determining the amount
of the offset was the contractor's cost of the work it was not re·
quired to do. See, Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md.652, 147 Atl.790.
In support of its claimed offset, the St:;i.te produced Robert
Rowley, a Project Engineer on a different job, which Respondent
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was also performing for the State of Utah (T.-Dam. 173.)

Mr.

Rowley produced a summary of men and equipment purportedly used
by the same contractor in its operations to finish grade the embankment constructed on the other project.

(See Ex. D-62.)

However, Mr. Rowley admitted that this summary was not a fair
estimate of the contractor's cost to complete this item.
194-195.)

(T.-Dam.

In fact, Mr. Rowley testified that his summary was in-

tended to show what that operation would cost the State if the
work were done on force account or cost plus.

(T.-Dam. 193.)

For

that purpose Mr. Rowley had computed equipment-costs based upon an
hourly rental rate, which he said also includes profit and other
factors

(T.-Dam. 187.) Also, he admitted that his labor figures

included not only the cost payable by the contractor,but an additional 30% for profit, which was allowed by the State in its force
account formula.

(T. -Dam. 188.)

In view of these admissions, it would appear that Mr. Rowley's
testimony and his summary (upon which Appellant's claimed offset is
based)

simply has no bearing on the real issue.

Appellant, in ef-

feet, concedes this when it states in its brief on appeal,

(in

arguing a different point) :
"As the court knows, a force account arrangement is
only resorted to when a price for work cannot otherwise
be arrived at.
It is artificial and bears little relation
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to reality so far as costs of an overall contract
(sic.)."
(Appellant's brief, p. 33,
Emphasis added.)
In view of Mr. Rowley's admission tha

his evidence was no:

designed to disclose the cost saving to the contractor of not
having to perform the finishing work,

the court was justified in

rejecting it, and probably would have committed reversable error
if it had made any awarded based on Mr. Rowley's evidence.
POINT VII
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO AWARD RESPONDENT
THE SUM OF $446, 531. 42 FOR THE EXPENSE OF EQUIPMENT RENTED FROM
OTHERS.
At the time the State breached the construction contract, t'.
contractor shut down its operations.

Thereafter, the contractor

released its construction crews, and turned back non-essential
equipment rented from others.

However, the State asserted that

it had not breached the contract and that the contractor was re·
quired to complete the construction work.

(See, Appellant's

Answer and Counter-Claim and Amendment thereto, R. 39, 69.)
Therefore, the contractor retained its key personnel and
certain of the rental equipment which it could not replace (T.·I:E:
28), until the end of April, 1976, when the court ruled in favor
of Respondent on this issue.
During this interval of seven months, while the responsibil::
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of the contractor to d9 the work remained in doubt, the contractor incurred out-of-pocket expense in salaries for its key personnel in the amount of $39,773.48, and paid out $446,531.42
in rental payments to others on the essential equipment it had
retained.
The trial court awarded Respondent damages for the full
amount of the salaries paid to its key personnel for the entire
period.

However, the court awarded only the sum of $191,370.00

for equipment rental payments, which the court stated approximated three month's rental, instead of the seven month's rental
claimed by Respondent.
The court based its award on certain testimony of Mr. Wood,
to the effect that the equipment retained would have been needed
for approximately three months had the breach

~

occurred.

This award is inconsistent for if, as the Court determined,
it was reasonable for the contractor to retain its key employees
on the payroll for seven

months while the status of the con-

tract was in doubt, it should also be prima facie reasonable for
the contractor to retain necessary equipment rented from others
for the same period.
The determination of this matter relates to the foreseeability
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of potential harm in each case by releasing the contractor•

5

ke;

employees on the one hand or its rented equipment on the other.
Since both were necessary to complete the contract in the event
the court had found the contract to be in force rather than ter.
minated, the contractor was equally justified in retaining both
its key employees and its necessary rented equipment.
The case of Blair v. US for the Use of Gregory-Hogan, 147
F .2d 840, cited by Appellant, recognizes the propriety of awardi:
damages upon a breach of contract for rental payment incurred on
equipment rented from others.

In fact, that case supports Res-

pondent's claims rather than Appellant's.
In a part not quoted by Appellant, the Blair case, supra,
also recognizes that there are limits to the duty of the contrac·
tor (upon repudiation of the contract by the other party) to
minimize his damages, especially where he rnust stand in readiness
to perform.

(See, Id., 147F.2d at 849.)

The Restatement of Contracts §336 (1) also recognizes in
effect, that a party not in breach is not required to incur undue
risk in order to avoid harm to itself arising out of the

brea~.

Corrunent (a) on that subsection provides as follows:
"After the Plaintiff has reason to know that a
breach has occurred • • • he is expected to take such
steps to avoid harm as a prudent person would take. He
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cannot get damages for harm that could thus be avoided . • • • In general, however, it is reasonable for
the Plaintiff to rely upon the Defendant to perform
as he has promised • • • • It is not reasonable to
expect the Plaintiff to avoid harm if at the time
for action it appears that the attempt may cause
other serious harm."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, it appears that at the time of the breach the Plaintiff
is not required to release its key personnel and all of its rented equipment, so long as it is reasonable to believe that it is
possible Plaintiff may later be required to perform the balance
of the contract.
In its brief, Appellant "

concedes that a rental ex-

pense incurred for machinery owned by others may be recoverable
by Respondent."

(Appellant's brief, p. 42.)

However, the Ap-

pellant asserts that the rental agreements in this case were
"purchase contracts in disguise".
evidence.

This is not supported by the

Some of the rental agreements contained options to

purchase the equipment.

However, the evidence was uncontroverted

that the Plaintiff had not exercised the options and didn't intend to.

(T.-Dam. 132-133.)

Appellant also contends that the "cut-off date" for the
allowance of equipment rentals and salaries to key personnel
should have been October 22, 1975, the date of EX.P-9 in which
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the contractor states "we consider our contract with the state
has been terminated."

(However, the State overlooked this same

letter in connection with its argument under Point II that the
contractor had elected to resume work under the contract.)
The contention of Appellant would have merit if on
October 22, 1975, Appellant had recognized its own breach of con·
tract.

However, it did not do so, and the only reason the con-

tractor retained this rented equipment past the date of the
breach was that until the court ruled otherwise, the State continued to insist that the contractor was bound to finish the
work.
The State should not now be permitted to profit by its own
intransigence by asserting that the contractor was bound at its
peril to release its key personnel and essential rental equipment the moment the contractor asserted (which the State dispute,:
that the contract was terminated.
Based on the same factors, no reason appears why the court
should have awarded rental expenses incurred for only three
months instead of the full period of seven months during which
the issue remained in doubt.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully submits
that the Judgment of the trial court should be sustained, except
that the Judgment should be modified to allow Respondent damages
for the sum of $446,531.42 as rental expenses incurred on equipment rented from others, rather than the lesser sum awarded by
the trial court.

Respectfully Submitted,

MARSHALL
rney for Respondent
strial Construction, Inc.
103 social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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